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Pannenberg, professor of theology at the University of Munich, is both celebrated and criticized as the architect of one of the most ambitious theological and philosophical projects of our century. Key to his work is the view that philosophy and theology are, properly understood, a single enterprise. One would expect that idea to be cheered by theologians, who are thus permitted back into the intellectual mainstream of Western culture. But Pannenberg cuts the cheering short, insisting that by "theology" he means a discipline based upon thoroughly modern, post-Enlightenment critical reason. Truth, he contends, cannot be established by appeal to religious authority or to the subjective experience called faith. Theological statements are truth claims based upon rational reflection upon public evidence. And so, as far as method is concerned, the theologian's task is not essentially different from that of, say, the secular and critical historian. This is not to deny that there may be other ways of "knowing" reality, such as through mystical experience. But as important as these ways are to the personal and communal life of believers, they do not constitute public knowledge. Public knowledge must be based upon public evidence, publicly examined and debated-and subject to public verification or falsification.
It is the last point that distresses many conventional theologians. They commonly believe that religious knowledge is secured by "epistemological privilege"; that is, such knowledge is derived from a divine revela-RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS is Senior Editor of Worldwiew.
tion that is not vulnerable'to critical challenge. In their view, Pannenberg pulls the rug out from under religious certitude and has in effect sold out to the secular scientific method.
If Pannenberg upsets conventional theologians, however, he is equally disturbing to the yet more conventional rationalists of secular intellectual discourse. He accuses them of an unscientific bias against asking the really big questions-the theological questions, if you will-about the meaning of reality. In the current work he explores sympathetically some of the reasons for this bias. It is important to underscore the sympathetic tone . of his critique: This is not just another Christian polemic against modern secularism. In fact, it is not too much to say that Pannenberg is first of all a modern secular man committed to Critical reason, and that therefore he is a believer.
This may sound contradictory on several scores, not least because religious belief is commonly thought to imply the suspension, if not the abandonment, of critical reason with respect to the truths believed. But Pannenberg argues that the very nature of biblical religion precludes such uncritical faith. A critical faith is not a compromise with modernity. I t is, rather, a more radical commitment, which takes the risk of making one's faith vulnerable to refutation by further evidence. This, according to Pannenbcrg, is required by a biblical religion that premises everything upon a promise that has not yet been fully'actualized. In biblical language that promise is, of course, the culmination of history in the coming of the Kingdom of God. The implication of this, so very frightening to many religious believers, is that the promise may turn out to be illusory.
Truth claims "have to be evaluated within the ... comprehensive horizon of an unfinished process of human history. Even today in that ongoing process o experience the question of the reality of God is not d nitely settled." And so, in answer to the question "Do s God exist?" Pannenberg's yes is a yes of hope. That that, if that hope is vindicated, then at the end of histor God's existence will be proved true and therefore 4 it i true of all of history, including the present moment. Biblical religion is an hypothesis about the ultimate meaning of history, of all experience in time.' Hypothe-23 ses can be true or false, depending upon the outcome of the experiment. The experiment in question here is history itself.
Pannenberg's contention-a theme of his many books and one extended importantly in the present volume-is that biblical religion provides the most rationally comprehensive and compelling, and therefore file most probably true, statement about the meaning of reality. It is imperative to emphasize that the "reality" in question is not some spiritual, eternal, or supernatural reality, but the reality of ordinary fact-such as is studied by the secular historian or by the physicist in his laboratory. It is to this reality that the biblical promise is attached. The theologian is not studying a different reality from that studied by other scientists; he is exploring a bolder hypothesis and pressing further, even to the ultimate, the partial meanings suggested by others. Although it requires careful translation if it is to be properly understood, Pannenberg's argument is that the meaning of everything is, quite simply and complicatedly, God. Or, to put 'it differently, the word "God" refers to the ultimate meaning of everything.
he modern mind gets very skittish when it T comes to talk about ultimate meanings.
We are inclined to dismiss such talk as nonsense, or else to retreat to our special and limited competence, leaving talk about ultimate meanings to the metaphysicians and theologians. I n fact, says Pannenberg, such an attitude reflects a failure of nerve and of intellectual responsibility. It also contributes to the situation in which theologians, only too happy to have some intellectual turf designated as "theirs," do their work in isolation from the larger discourse. And that of course has a circular effect, since it confirms other disciplines in their prejudice that theological language has to do with a world quite different from their own. But the basic deception in the refusal of the self-consciously secular mind to deal with big questions of meaning is self-deception. That is, the sociologist, political scientist, or historian who says he eschews such questions of meaning is in fact operating with assumptions about "the meaning of it all" that he refuses to examine very carefully. He may think his "meaning assumptions" are very modest and limited, therefore entailing little intellectual risk. Pannenberg is merciless, however, in pressing the connection between small assumptions and their antecedent or subsequent implications. In this way he demonstrates that all of us think within a comprehensive, or religious, interpretation of reality, whether we wish to examine it very carefully or not. Pannenberg illustrates his argument by reference to the task of the historian; that is because the book at hand deals with the idea of history and, more important, because history is the central category of Pannenberg's whole intellectual enterprise, being for all practical purposes synonymous with reality itself. In saying that all social meaning and intellectual discourse is religiously based, Pannenberg draws on the tradition of Emile Durkheim as represented today by thinkers such as Talcott Parsons and Thomas Luckmann. Unless the historian fancies himself to be merely a cataloguer of raw facts (which is self-deception, since all facts are intepreted facts), he posits some meaning to the events he writes about.
He may see history as a moral tale, perhaps demonstrating classic Greek preachments about the connection between hubris and tragedy. Until recently many historians subscribed in one way or another to the myth of a linear history of human progress, and some still do. Others, of a more romantic or socialist bent, assume some kind of cosmic primordial order that has been distorted by bad social structures, in which case history is the struggle for that true human nature in perfect harmony with its universe. There are other religious interpretations of reality by which historians operate, but the point is that we should not try to tuck these away in the closet of our private beliefs, as though they could be isolated from our understanding of particular events within the larger scheme of history.
"Nature abhors a vacuum," Spinoza declared, and Talcott Parsons and others have extended that insight to the argument that societies cannot tolerate a vacuum with respect to their ultimate meaning. Because of their effort to isolate religious meaning from their public statements, historians have contributed to the creation of a vacuum in our public life. More specifically, by refusing to deal seriously with the primary belief system of Western history, the biblical tradition, a dangerous gap has developed between our public interpretation of reality and what the majority of people actually believe history is all about. "If Western culture does not reappropriate the religious roots of its vision of freedom together with a more holistic reinterpretation of society, then its own people-and especially the younger generation-will cry out for socialism because they less and less will be able and willing to stand the meaninglessness of public life." The term "socialism" in this context may be misleading. The threat comes not only from the Left but also from the Right, as in National Socialism. It comes from whatever political source offers to provide the religious meaning without which the fragile achievement of freedom cannot survive. A politically enforced belief system means at least an authoritarian and, given the propensities and powers of the modern state, more likely a totalitarian society.
here are many possible interpretations of T history or constructions of reality. They should be acknowledged and debated as frankly as possible in the arena of public discourse. Certainly one of the most impressive and pervasive is the interpretation of history that sees it as the drama issuing from the "election" of the people of Israel and pointing toward history's consummation in the Kingdom of God. In this interpretation the covenant with Israel is extended to include the Christian church, and the latter is viewed, not as an exclusivist community, but as an effective symbol of the future of all humankind. In this vision the crucial metaphors for understanding history are election, covenant, judgment, and vindication.
Pannenberg challenges the assumption of Toynbee, for instance, that the basic "units" of history are discrete civilizations, twenty-one of them to be precise: Do civilizations in the sense of the recently accepted definition of that term really form those basic units of history? The case of Western history does not provide a particularly favorable example for that theory. It seems more natural to take the entire development of Christianity to represent one such historical unit. That would include not only Western history all the way through the modern period but also the Byzantine empire and the heirs of the Byzantine culture, especially Russia. T o make religion the fundamental issue in determining the basic units of history would also correspond to the assumption of modern sociological theory that religion in one form or another constitutes the basis of the social system. Certainly, religion is not necessarily bound to a particular social system. The Christian religion became basic for different forms of social systems in the course of Christian history without being confined within their limits. On the other hand, religious continuity itself provides a degree of social and cultural continuity, since religion is concerned not only with another world but with a transcendent reality that constitutes the true meaning of precisely this present life and world.
Obviously, the above paragraph is heavily loaded. Pannenberg tends to take a great deal for granted as to the knowledge and sophistication of his readers. But even those unfamiliar with his larger project will recognize the obviousness, if you will, of Pannenberg's question: Why-aside from church historians or historians of Christianity-is the patent continuity of Christianity as an interpretive mechanism so neglected in the modern study of history? Why are economic, political, racial, national, and other factors assumed to be the significant variables in historical change, rather than belief systems? This is especially odd when it is manifestly clear that historical actors interpreted their time in history by reference to the belief ,sj'stem of Christianity. In this connection Pannenberg offers brief but telling observations about the link between the rise of nationalism and the concept of historical election in biblical thought.
Pannenberg proposes a short schema for a reinterpretation that uses Christianity as the basic historical unit. The first period in such a schema is that of the.Christian empire. Christianity before and after the fourth century is not as "starkly different" as many think, he says, because both periods are "governed by one and the same principle, the direct application of the rule of Christ, the heavenly king, to the administration of society.'' Christianity "sinned," however, and therefore came under judgment. That violation of the covenant consisted in Christianity's exclusiveness about its own chosenness; an exclusiveness "first visible in the relationship of Christianity to the Jewish people, who were no longer recognized as the people of God." Byzantine Christianity also violated the covenant' by "imperial insistence on dogmatic uniformity." The judgment resulting from such violation took the form of the rise of Islam.
"The second period in Christian history was that of the superiority of the church in determining the Christian identity of the social system." During what we
The last point is critical for Pannenberg's argument. The third, or modern, era was brought about by the religious wars of the sixteenth and, more important, the seventeenth century. Religious conflict almost destroyed the basis for a common society, and therefore, through the secular enlightenment and other developments, thoughtful people became increasingly convinced that public life must be established upon nonreligious foundations and religion confined to the private sphere. That change largely explains the reticence of modern intellectuals to deal in the public arena with religious belief, with the ultimate questions of meaning. Yet-and here there is 'elegant irony-even the divine judgment represented in, for example, the French Revolution's Reign of Terror was instrumental in moving Christianity into a new, and in some ways stronger, period. "Nevertheless, the principle of religious and political liberty, the basic principle of modern culture, could be understood-and has been understood-as representing the most universal and concrete realization so far of the Christian faith in human life. In contrast to the particularism of the confessional churches disproving each other by their narrow dogmatism, the principle of religious and political freedom could be taken as the universally valid expression of that Christian freedom which the Reformers had identified as characterizing the very essence of Christian faith."
The impact of the Reformation on the social order was well articulated, although only partially actualized, by people like John Milton and Cromwell in England. The key insight was that of the immediacy of the individual to God, and therefore the individual's absolute value, and therefore the necessity of pluralism in the social order, without which the modern concept of freedom is impossible. As Hegel noted, "Christian faith assured the individual of his unity with the absolute truth." Until Christianity, Pannenberg argues in the earlier essays in the present book, the individual was valued in terms of his relationship to tribe, economic order, hierarchical religious institution, or, as in classical Greek thought, in terms of an abstract idea temporarily embodied in a person. Pannenberg is at pains to emphasize that the Christian contribution did not appear ex nihilo, but is derived from and is still dependent upon developments within Judaism. Although proclaimed long ago, the actualization of this truth awaited the modern era, which, ironically, was launched largely in opposition to Christianity, or at least in opposition to the church. But the important truth for today is this: If religion is the heart of society, then "it depends on the kind of religion whether it allows for the final value of individual life and consequently for pluralism of behavior and opinion." n The Cultural Cotitradictions of Capital-I ism, Daniel Bell has joined others in worrying about whether the public values of liberal democracy are sufficient to save it from the forces of obvious corrosion. He suspects that the answer to this question is somehow to be found in religion. But to t h e secular modern mind religion is understandably suspect. In dismissing a viewpoint today, it is sufficient to say that it is "sectarian." But Pannenberg contends that we should not fear the divisive power of sectarianism-or, more precisely, of particularism-provided that public discourse is controlled by the canons of critical reason. He is confident that Christianity can hold its own in such a debate, but whether the new era of Christian culture that he envisions is possible depends upon a number of radical changes. It would require that secular intellectuals overcome their bias against religion and ultimate meanings. But before that can happen, Christianity itself must change in several significant ways.
First, Christianity must finally and definitively come to terms with its relationship to living Judaism within God's one election and covenant. (Speaking of the judgment visited on Germany in World War 11, Pannenberg writes: "The single most serious reason for that in theological as well as in historical terms may have been the persecution and attempted annihilation of the Jewish people. This attempt disclosed to the world the radical nature of [German] nationalism.") Second, the church must understand, accept, and even celebrate its synibolic role in history. It must repudiate once and for all the temptation to dominate the political order. Marx was right, Pannenberg implies: Religion is the sigh of an oppressed humanity. It is in articulating that sigh that the church makes its most crucial contribution-expressing the hunger for the Kingdom that cannot be satisfied by any political order, and keeping every political order under judgment so that it does not idolatrously identify itself with the Kingdom.
This emphasis upon the symbolic nature of the church is posited against Byzantine and Western efforts coercively to impose a "Christian society," and also against contemporary regimes and revolutionary movements (the latter sometimes employing "liberation theology") that claim an absolute religious legitimation for their rule. The symbolic role of the church is also important to the relationship between Christianity and other religions, underscoring the fact that Christianity is neither a threat nor an exclusivist c1u.b of the saved but, rather, a lively celebration of the promised future that belongs to all of humanity.
The third major change required of Christianity is Americans have perhaps learned too well the evils of "manifest destiny." It may be that in the larger scheme of history America is, in some significant sense, elected or chosen, although it is almost impossible to say that today without rousing a storm of protest. But election, in Pannenberg's view, should not feed national pride or pretensions to privilege and power. Election means that at a moment in history a particular people faces special responsibility and opportunity; to be elected is a prospect that should humble more than it exalts. "The inherent dangers in any claim to chosenness are obvious. They are essentially the same as in the history of ancient Israel-pride, exclusivism, presumptuous security, and contempt for possible or even impending judgment. But these dangers do not render the claim to chosenness illegitimate. They are taken care of by the category of judgment. By its claim to chosenness a group ... thus makes itself accountable to the terms of God's covenant." This view of historical election gives a surprising-and in some superpatriotic circles an unwelcometwist to the 1954 addition to the pledge of allegiance: "one nation, under God ...." Yet there is no denying that he is still in many respects a European thinker. His grasp of the nuances of American pluralism, for example, or of the much tortured American debate about ChurchState relations, is sometimes tenuous. Yet, as has so often happened in the past, it is precisely this distance that enables some Europeans to see, better than we do, the significance of the American experiment. In any case, this latest book of essays reinforces the belief that, for Christians and non-Christians, there are few thinkers today worth reading and arguing with more than Wolfhart Pannenberg.
